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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini bertujuan menyelidik hubungan penyebab antara hasil cukai kerajaan dengan
perbelanjaan kerajaan. Kaedahjangka panjang bukan penyebab Granger yang dicadangkan oleh
Toda dan Yamamoto (1995) digunakan untuk menguji hubungan penyebab tersebut untuk
tempoh masa 1960 hingga 1997. Hasil kajian menunjukkan kewujudan hubungan penyebab dua
hala di antara perbelanjaan kerajaan dengan hasil cukai kerajaan.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the causal relationship between the government
tax revenues and government expenditures in Malaysia. We employ the Granger long run non-
causality test as proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to test the causal relationships between
government spending and tax revenues for the period 1960 to 1997. The evidence generally
supports the existence of bi-directional casuality between government spending and tax revenues.
INTRODUCTION
Governmen t expenditures in Malaysia have
almost consistently exceeded government
revenues throughout most of the past decades
since 1959 except for the 1959-61 and 1993-97
periods. The government's commitment in
pursuing rapid economic development
programmes as embodied in the various five
year Malaysian develoment plans largely accounts
for the fiscal deficits incurred. The expanded
role of the public sector resulted in rapid growth
of government expenditures.
Government budget deficits have significant
impact on the economy. Such fiscal imbalance
tends to reduce national savings which in turn
has the effect of impeding rapid economic
growth. The options available to stimulate
economic growth in a budget deficit economy
include reducing government expenditures and/
or raising tax revenues. Both options serve the
objective of reducing the fiscal deficit.
One of the most researched topics in
macroeconomics is the empirical testing of the
relationship between government expenditures
and tax revenues. Establishing the direction of
interdependence between the two macro-
economic variables, namely, government
expenditures and tax revenues would assist policy
makers in identifying the source of any fiscal
imbalances that might exist. Consequently this
would facilitate efforts to develop a suitable
fiscal reform strategy.
The purpose of this study is to investigate
the causal relationship between the government
tax revenues and government expenditures for
the period 1959 to 1997. We have utilised the
more recent technique proposed by Toda and
Yamamoto (1995) in the attempt to determine
the interdependence between the two variables
mentioned. According to Toda and Yamamoto,
their Granger long-run non-causality analysis,
provide a simplistic approach in determining
the association between integrated variables
without having to worry about the order of
integration and/or the cointegrating rank in a
Vector Autoregression (VAR) system.
UTERATURE REVIEW
The relationship between government revenue
and expenditure can be categorized into three
main competing hypotheses. First, the fiscal
synchronization hypothesis implies that taxation
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and spending decisionS-are simultaneously made
by the fiscal authorities. In the Granger sense,
this is known as a bi-directional relationship
between tax revenue and government spending.
Second, a unidirectional causality that runs from
revenue to expenditure supports the so-called
tax-and-spend hypothesis. The hypothesis
indicates that, since government revenue causes
changes in government expenditure, the control
of tax revenue should represent a good policy to
reduce the size of the government expenditure.
On the other hand, the spend-and-tax hypothesis
implies that government expenditure leads to
changes in tax revenue. In other words, the
chain of causality is running from government
spending to tax revenue.
Empirical evidences with respect to the above
three competing hypotheses are at best mixed.
Musgrave (1966), Meltzer and Richard (1981),
Miller and Russek (1990), Bohn (1991) and
Bhat et at. (1993) supported the fiscal
synchronization hypothesis. Studies by Friedman
(1972, 1978), Buchanan and Wagner (1977,
1978), Darrat (1998), Blackley (1986), Marlow
and Manage (1987) andJoulfaian and Mookerjee
(1990); all indicated that govern men t tax
revenues lead expenditures. On the other hand,
the spend-and-tax hypothesis is supported by
studies done by Peacock and Wiseman (1961,
1979), Jones and Joulfaian (1991), Anderson et
at. (1986), von Furstenberg et at. (1986) and
Provopoulos and Zambaras (1991). Conversely,
apart from those studies, Baghestani and
McNown (1994) found that government
expenditure and revenue are not
in terdependen t.
Other studies on the government revenue-
expenditure nexus found a diversity of results,
depending on the time period used, lag length
and also between different levels of government.
For instance, Manage and Marlow (1986) found
out that using different lag lengths gave different
sets of results. Varying the lag length between
two and five, the result indicates that in all cases
the lower and most upper lag lengths suggest
unidirectional relationship; a causal relation that
runs from expenditures to revenues. On the
other hand, the intermediate lag length provides
support for bi-directional causal relationship
between the two variables. Ram (1988) used
both annual and quarterly data to examine the
expenditures-revenues nexus for both Federal
government and State and Local government.
The study arrived at conflicting results too. For
example, using annual data, the results support
the fiscal synchronization hypothesis at the
federal government level. However, when
quarterly data was used, the results suggest that
causality runs from revenues to expenditures,
thus, supporting the tax-and-spend hypothesis.
But, at the state and local level, both annual and
quarterly data indicate results that support the
spend-and-tax hypothesis. In another study,
Owoye (1995) studied the causal relationship
between taxes and expenditures in the G7
countries. Despite the similarities in terms of the
economic settings of the sample countries, Owoye
found that the results of the causality
relationships are not similar. The empirical
results obtained from the error-eorrection models
support the fiscal synchronization hypothesis for
the U.S, Germany, U.K, France and Canada.
This implies that the fiscal authorities in these
countries make tax and spending decisions
jointly. On the other hand, causality runs from
revenues to expenditures in Japan and Italy,
thus, supporting the tax-and-spend hypothesis.
METHOD OF ESTIMATIONS
It has been noted that the traditional Granger
(1969) causality test for inferring leads and lags
among integrated variables will end up in
spurious regression results, and the F-test is not
valid unless the variables in levels are
cointegrated. New development in econometric
offers the error-correction model (Engle and
Granger 1987) and the vector autoregression
error-correction model (Johansen and Juselius
1990) as alternatives for testing of non-causality
between economic time series. Unfortunately,
these tests are cumbersome and sensitive to the
values of the parameters in finite samples and
therefore their results are unreliable (Toda and
Yamamoto 1995; Zapata and Rambaldi 1997).
Furthermore, pretests are necessary to determine
the number of unit roots and the cointegrating
ranks before proceeding to estimate the Vector
Error-Correction Model (VECM).
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose a
simple procedure requiring the estimation of an
'augmented' VAR, which guarantees the
asymptotic distribution of the MWald statistic
even when there is cointegration. The Toda-
Yamamoto causality procedure has been labelled
as the long-run causality tests. One needs to
determine the maximal order of in tegration d
max
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which is expected in the model and construct a
VAR in their levels with a total of p = (k + d ma)
lags. Toda and Yamamoto point out that for d=1
the lag selection procedure is always valid since
k(l=d. If d=2, then the procedure is also valid
unless k=1. Moreover, according to Toda and
Yamamoto, the MWald statistic is valid regardless
whether a series is 1(0), 1(1) or 1(2), non-
cointegrated or cointegrated of any arbitrary
order.
To examine the causality between
government expenditure and government
revenue our structural VAR model consist of
three (p=3) variables; government revenues
(GR), government expenditures (GE) and
national output (Q).l Using Akaike's Information
Criteria (AlC) as the lag selection criteria, say,
the lag length chosen k=2. If d max=l, then we
must estimate a VAR(3). Suppose we want to test
that GE does not Granger cause GR, we then
test that GE'_I and GE t_ 2 do not appear in the
GR, equation. The estimated system is:
(1.1)
where A's are three by three matrices of
coefficients with Ao as an identity matrix. The
null hypothesis is H o : aW =a~~ =0, where a~~are
the coefficients of GEt_i' i=l, 2, in the first
equation of the system. The existence of a
causality from government expenditure to
government revenue can be established through
rejecting the above null hypothesis which
requires finding the significance of the MWald
statistic2 for the group of the lagged independent
variables identified above. A similar testing
procedure can be applied to the alternative
hypothesis that government revenue does not
Granger cause government expenditure, is to
test H o : aW = a~;) =0, where a~~ are the
coefficients of CRt-i, i=I,2, in the second equation
of system equation (1.1) where the system is
being estimated as a VAR(3).
Sources and Description of Data Used
The study utilised annual data series for all
three variables, namely government revenues,
government expenditures and output for the
period 1960 to 1990. The real GDP series were
utilised to proxy for national real output. All
variables were compiled from various issues of
the Quarterly Bulletin published by Bank Negara
Malaysia.
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The application of the Toda-Yamamoto approach
requires information about the lag length (k)
and the maximum order of integration (d) of
the variables. The order of integration of each
variable is not examined as a pretest. This is
because in most cases, the order of the
integration of macroeconomic variables are at
most two. The causality test for both d =1 and
d max=2 is done after selecting the lag l~;gth.
In this study, the optimal lag length was
determined using the AlC. Although the AlC
chose k=l as the optimal lag, we have presented
k=2 and k=3 to show the robustness of the
results at various lag lengths. We therefore
estimated a system of VARs (p) where
(p=dm~+k=2,p=dm~+k=3,p=dm~+k=4;p=dm~+k=3,
p=dmax+k=4, p=dmax+k=5) and then calibrated the
MWaid test statistics The result for d =1 andmax
d max=2 are presented in Tables 1 and 2
respectively. In each table we have also presented
the respective p-values.
The test results in Table 1 clearly suggest
that government revenue and government
expenditure are bi-directional in nature. The
results are robust irrespective of the number of
lag length estimated. For all lag length chosen,
lag 1, 2 and 3, indicate that the null hypothesis
of Granger non-causality from government
revenues to government expenditures is rejected
1. Output is included in the analysis as a third variable because both government expenditures and government
revenues are related to the overall conditions in the economy (see Payne, 1997). Furthermore, the inclusion of
output is to alleviate the problem of spurious causal effects due to omitted important variable from the investigated
relationship.
2. With the degree of freedom equal to the number of restriction imposed.
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at the five percent significance level. At the same
time, the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality
from government expenditures to government
revenues can be rejected at the five percent
significance level for all lag length. These results
support the fiscal synchronization hypothesis for
Malaysia.
Our results in Table 2 suggest similar bi-
directional causality that runs from government
expenditures to government revenues and from
government revenues to government
expenditures in the case of d max=2. The null
hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from
government revenues to government
expenditures and from government expenditures
to government revenues is rejected at the five
percent significance level. The robustness of the
results of both the dmax=l and d max=2 supports
the existence of a two-way causal relationship
between government expenditure and tax
revenues in Malaysia.
CONCLUSION
Most of the empirical studies addressing the
debate about the causal relationships between
government expenditures and revenues have
focused on developed nations. In addition, the
procedures employed were based on the testing
for unit root, cointegration, error-correction
modeling and the vector error-correction
modeling and Granger causality.
This study, however, adopts the methodology
TABLE 1
Results of long-run non-causality test due to Tocla-Yamamoto (1995) for dmax =1
Null hypothesis Test statistics
MWaid statistics p-values
k=l:
Government revenue does not Granger cause government expenditure
Government expenditure does not Granger cause government revenue
18.484
8.161
0.000**
0.004**
k=2:
Government revenue does not Granger cause government expenditure
Government expenditure does not Granger cause government revenue
33.110
18.453
0.000**
0.000**
k=3:
Government revenue does not Granger cause government expenditure
Government expenditure does not Granger cause government revenue
36.663
13.312
0.000**
0.004**
Notes: Asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at one and five percent level respectively.
TABLE 2
Results of long-run non-causality test due to Toda-Yamamoto (1995) for dmax=2
Null hypothesis Test statistics
MWald statistics p-values
18.960 0.000**
18.430 0.000**
31.962 0.000**
13.264 0.001 **
53.645 0.000**
18.093 0.000**
k=3:
Government revenue does not Granger cause government expenditure
Government expenditure does not Granger cause government revenue
k=l:
Government revenue does not Granger cause government expenditure
Government expenditure does not Granger cause government revenue
k=2:
Government revenue does not Granger cause government expenditure
Government expenditure does not Granger cause government revenue
Notes: Asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at one and five percent level respectively.
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of Granger non-causality recently proposed by
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to test the causal
relationship between government expenditures
and government revenues for Malaysia. The
evidence, based on MWald-tests, generally
supports the existence of the bi-directional
causality between government spending and
government revenues. The results are robust
with respect to our assumption that the variables
are 1(1) and 1(2).
The empirical evidence of bi-directional
causal relationship implies fiscal synchronization
in Malaysia. This suggests that the government
compares the marginal benefits and marginal
costs of any balanced budget change when
formulating a decision in terms of the
appropriate levels of government revenues and
expenditures.
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